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Summary
The recommendation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission
to lift the exclusion of women from ground combat is deeply irresponsible
and cannot be taken seriously. The Commission’s lodestar was diversity, not
military effectiveness, and it failed to take into consideration a wealth of
information bearing on its recommendation.
The Commission’s recommendation was based primarily on its analysis
of three sources of information: a 1997 RAND study by Harrell & Miller, a
2009 report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services,
and anecdotal reports. None of the sources that the Commission consulted
can be considered authoritative, and the Commission’s analysis of the
sources that it did consult was superficial and in conflict with some of the
facts, as opposed to the “spin,” contained in these very sources.
The Commission substantially downplayed the sex difference in strength
and other physical capacities, striking down the straw man that “all women
lack the physical ability to perform in combat roles,” but never addressing
how many women there are who actually possess that ability, a piece of data
that is highly relevant to its recommendation. A British Ministry of Defence
study concluded that the number was about one percent of trained female
soldiers, but the Commission did not consult that source, preferring to deal
with straw arguments that no one actually makes.
The MLDC report does not mention the word “pregnancy,” despite the
fact that there is much data to suggest that pregnancy has substantial adverse
effects on deployability and readiness. Importing these problems into ground
combat units is exceedingly unwise, but the Commission chose to ignore the
entire issue.
Finally, the Commission reported that there was “little evidence” that
integration of women has had a negative impact on cohesion and
performance. In fact, there is such evidence, including that presented in the
sources that the Commission did consult–the RAND report, the DACOWITS
report, and in anecdotal accounts. Moreover, on this issue, as on others, the
Commission’s response to what it viewed as an absence of evidence was not
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to call for the gathering of evidence but rather to declare that there was no
problem.
In fact, the very sources cited by the Commission provide substantial
reason to question its conclusions. Although the DACOWITS report
downplayed any concerns about integration, it actually contained information
suggesting that some members of its focus groups entertained substantial
concerns that integration would negatively affect cohesion. Reasons cited
included sexual tension and harassment, female emotionality, having to
exercise discretion or decorum to avoid offending females, differential
physical standards, the impact on personnel strength caused by women
getting pregnant (often deliberately) and either not deploying or being sent
home as a consequence, as well as logistical issues such as hygiene. The
RAND report cited similar concerns.
The Commission did not take seriously the objections of those who
counsel caution. When it mentioned these objections at all, the source of the
objection was never mentioned, the specific arguments never dealt with, and,
in fact, when any source was cited at all, it was to descriptions of the
arguments against integration by proponents of integration. From the
bibliography of the Commission report, one would not know that anyone had
ever written anything negative about the sexual integration of combat units.
If the question of integration of ground combat units is to be considered,
it should be based on an analysis produced by people whose expertise is
combat, not diversity. Moreover, in considering whether to make such a
momentous decision, the opinions of the people most affected by the decision
and in the best position to estimate its effects–men in ground-combat
specialties with recent ground-combat experience–should be solicited and
taken seriously. 
1 Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2011). From Representation to
Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military, p. 74.
http://mldc.whs.mil/download/documents/Final Report/MLDC_Final_Report.pdf.
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The Report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission: 
An Inadequate Basis for Lifting the Exclusion of 
Women from Direct Ground Combat 
Introduction
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 authorized
creation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC). The
Commission was charged with conducting “a comprehensive evaluation and
assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and
advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority
members who are senior officers,” and it was directed to report to the
President and Congress on its recommendations “for improving diversity
within the Armed Forces.” In March 2011, the Commission issued its report,
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century
Military. That report made a number of recommendations, including a
recommendation that all restrictions on women serving in combat roles be
lifted. Although the Commission suggested that the modification should be
“time-phased,” it stated that any delay in developing new policies was for
purposes of determining how integration should proceed, not whether it
should proceed.1
Elimination of age-old restrictions barring women from combat is a
serious step that should be taken only with a high degree of confidence that
it would not degrade the military’s capacity to perform its mission.
Unfortunately, the MLDC failed to give the question the serious attention it
deserved. The Commission’s failure to focus clearly on combat effectiveness
is understandable in light of its charter, which was directed toward diversity
and not toward military effectiveness. Had its charge been to study battlefield
effectiveness and to suggest means by which to enhance it, the composition
of the Commission would have been very different–putting a premium on
combat experience rather than diversity experience–and the Commission
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2 MLDC Report, p. viii.
3 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces.
(1992). Women in Combat: Report to the President. McLean, VA: Brassey’s (US).
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the unsurprising proposition that “male servicemenbers are on average physically stronger
and have higher cardiovascular abilities.” Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2011).
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would have had to collect and examine a very different kind of data. If a
“Battlefield Effectiveness Commission” were to reach the same conclusions
as the MLDC actually did, one can only imagine that it would have done a
better job of justifying them.
Presumably because of its dedication to diversity, the Commission
appeared to believe that the burden of proof rests on those favoring current
policies that exclude women from ground combat rather than on those who
advocate a radical change in the status quo. For example, the Commission
reports that there is “little evidence” that inclusion of women in previously
closed fields has had negative effects on performance or cohesion. Note that
the Commission does not suggest that there is much evidence that it would
not have negative effects. Even aside from the fact that the Commission
ignored a great deal of evidence of negative effects despite its airy claim that
its report was “founded on rigorous research,”2 the Commission should have
sought more information before concluding that integration does not present
serious threats to cohesion and recommending a dramatic change in policy.
Strangely, the principal MLDC report did not make even passing
reference to the 1992 report of the Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces,3 which had, in the wake of the
Gulf War, recommended against admission of women into ground-combat
specialties.4 On the burden of proof issue, noted military sociologist and
member of the Presidential Commission Charles Moskos stated at that time:
You raised a question, Mr. Chair, where the burden of proof should
lie. Other things being equal, you say, well, then let equal opportunity
triumph. Well, most of the evidence that we’ve heard here–and there
will be some debate about the degree–is that mixed-gender units,
Analysis of MLDC Report
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particularly as it gets closer to the combat area, have lower
deployment rates, higher attrition, less physical strength, more sexual
activity, higher costs, et cetera, et cetera. It would seem to me the
burden of the proof would be on the side of saying equal opportunity
is of such significance that we’re going to override some of these
costs.5
Dr. Moskos’s observations are no less apt today. 
Despite the MLDC’s claim that its recommendations are based on
“rigorous research,” the data sources it relied upon are wholly inadequate to
the task and provide no basis for its conclusion that “neither research nor
practical experience” supports concern over negative effects of sexual
integration. Indeed, some of the sources cited by the Commission contain
information inconsistent with its conclusions, while others lack any kind of
authoritative basis at all. It is quite remarkable that the Commission would
reach its conclusion based on such a perfunctory inquiry, giving great weight
to sources of questionable merit and ignoring abundant evidence to the
contrary. 
Section I of this paper will describe the sources relied upon by the
Commission and will attempt to demonstrate that the sources are not as
authoritative as the Commission appeared to believe; moreover, these sources
themselves provide data inconsistent with the Commission’s conclusions.
Section II of this paper will show that there is much available information
touching on relevant subjects that does not appear even to have been
consulted by the Commission. Finally, Section III will note a series of issues
that the Commission did not even touch on that should be weighed in any
decision to integrate women into combat units.
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6 Harrell, M. C., & Miller, L. L. (1997). New Opportunities for Military Women:
Effects Upon Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, p. 99.
7 The phrase “leadership and training” was incorrectly quoted by the Commission as
“rank and training.” Decision Paper #2, p. 29.
8 Harrell & Miller, p. 80.
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I. THE COMMISSION’S PRIMARY SOURCES OF DATA
PROVIDE LITTLE SUPPORT FOR ITS
CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commission relied primarily on three sources in reaching its
conclusion that there was no cause for concern that sexual integration would
negatively effect cohesion or effectiveness: a 1997 RAND report on sexual
integration, a 2009 report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in
the Services (DACOWITS), and anecdotal evidence. Taken together they are
very weak support for the Commission’s recommendations. 
A. The 1997 Harrell and Miller Study
The MLDC placed primary weight on the 1997 RAND Corporation
report titled New Opportunities for Military Women: Effects Upon Readiness,
Cohesion, and Morale authored by Margaret Harrell & Laura Miller. That
report concluded that “gender integration is perceived to have a relatively
small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale in the units we studied.”6 It
should be emphasized that the RAND report did acknowledge that there were
some negative effects. It was able to characterize those effects as small,
however, only by attributing many of the adverse consequences that it
reported to “other influences, such as leadership and training.”7 As discussed
below, however, it took substantial intellectual gymnastics by Harrell and
Miller to divorce these consequences from integration itself. 
A thorough review of the RAND study would have revealed good reason
for a responsible decision-maker in the MLDC’s position to make further
inquiry. For example, Harrell and Miller found considerable resentment
among men due to their perception that despite demands for equal
recognition women do not contribute their share to the work of the unit.8
They also found that dating and sexual relationships were perceived to
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10 Harrell & Miller, pp. 81-82.
11 Harrell & Miller, pp. 77-81.
12 Harrell & Miller, p. xx.
13 Harrell & Miller, p. 81.
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reduce morale, especially on ships and on overseas deployments.9 The
“sexualization” of the atmosphere made it difficult for colleagues to regard
one another as just co-workers, they reported, thereby undermining cohesion.
They describe one respondent’s complaint that “the mess . . . at night [for]
this unit looks more like a singles club or promenade deck than a mess hall.”
Another respondent complained:
This place is like high school all over again. Everyone is dating
others. To me this is not the military. We are here to do a job not
meet our spouse. Guys seem more worried about getting a girl than
doing their job.10
Harrell & Miller also reported a widespread belief that double standards
existed for the two sexes.11 They stated, “We heard repeatedly how double
standards (e.g., different performance expectations, different responsibilities)
undermine women’s credibility and generate hostility from junior enlisted
men, who believed that they are afforded the fewest privileges of anyone.”12
Belief in double standards was enhanced by such practices as allowing
women to take showers every 72 hours while in the field. One need not
invoke sexism to understand the resentment “among the men, who endure a
heavier workload when the women, the vehicles, and the drivers return to
base so that women can take showers.”13
Harrell & Miller further reported complaints that women were more
inclined than men to resist leadership–to object to being told to do something
their commander’s way “because he said so”–a tendency that is reasonably
thought by senior enlisted and officers to “undermine[] discipline and the
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14 Harrell & Miller, pp. 85-86. It should be noted that this finding is consistent with
social-science evidence suggesting that women’s norms of equality cause them to fit less
comfortably into hierarchical organizations. See Benenson, J. F., & Schinazi, J. (2004). Sex
Differences in Reactions to Outperforming Same-Sex Friends. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 22:317–333; Browne, K. R. (2007). Co-ed Combat: The New
Evidence that Women Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s Wars. New York: Sentinel, pp. 164-167.
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rank authority system.”14 Additionally, they recount reports that senior
personnel were hesitant to reprimand or discipline women, meaning that
“junior females were permitted to espouse these attitudes more freely than
their male colleagues.” Despite their observation that “gender is one of the
ways in which subordinates are now reported to be challenging or even
chastising their superiors,” Harrell & Miller insisted that the problem was
attributable to a “generation gap” and not to sexual integration.
Despite all of these problems, how was it that Harrell and Miller were
able to conclude that integration was perceived as having a relatively small
effect on cohesion and readiness? The answer is that they recharacterized the
problems as problems of leadership and training rather than as problems
created by integration. The attribution of problems to these other influences
illustrates a form of sleight-of-hand by which any problem can be redefined
as something other than what it really is. Faith in better “leadership” as the
solution seems to rest on an unstated syllogism: (1) with adequate leadership,
sexual integration would not be a problem; (2) sexual integration has caused
problems; (3) therefore, leadership is inadequate. If leadership is inadequate,
the train of logic seems to proceed, then it is not sexual integration that is the
problem. With this reasoning, virtually any problem (whether sexual
harassment, fraternization, lack of unit cohesion, concern about favoritism
and double standards, drugs, AIDS, poor equipment, or virtually anything
else) can be redefined as simply a “leadership” problem.
Harrell and Miller’s study could best be characterized as concluding that
sexual integration led to a number of negative effects but that these effects
could be mitigated with better leadership and training. That is very different
from saying that integration did not produce negative effects. Moreover, their
contention that leadership and training, rather than integration itself, were the
problem was largely unsupported, and the nature of the “leadership” and
“training” modifications that would mitigate the problems was unspecified.
What kind of leadership would it take, for example, to cause young men and
Analysis of MLDC Report
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Readiness. Washington Times, Nov. 7, p. A-3.
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young women at the height of their reproductive lives not to perceive each
other sexually and not to have those perceptions affect their behavior?
Unsurprisingly, we are not told.
A similar kind of sleight-of-hand characterizes Harrell and Miller’s
treatment of their finding that women tended to be more resistant to authority
and unwilling to take orders than men. The authors’ apparent unwillingness
to conclude that the problem was sex seems to have caused them, again, to
recharacterize the problem as something else. So, instead of this being a
“gender issue,” they asserted, this sex difference really reflects a “generation
gap” not a “gender gap.”15 According to the researchers, the cause of the
increasingly common resistance to leadership is that the military was drawing
from an undisciplined “generation that was never spanked.” The trend only
appeared to be related to sex, they argued, “because women are
overrepresented in the younger generation.” Thus, “generational differences
were occasionally reported as a gender problem.” Contrary to Harrell and
Miller, however, women were not “overrepresented in the younger
generation” of soldiers, although they were represented at a higher level than
they had been in the past. They still made up only about 15 percent of the
junior ranks. Therefore, if resistance to leadership were sex neutral, only
about one out of seven of the “resisters” would be female and six out of
seven would be men, hardly the basis for a general impression that the
problem was especially associated with women.
It should also be noted that the version of the Harrell & Miller study that
was publicly released was substantially less negative about the consequences
of integration than the original draft had been. Numerous changes were made
between the draft version of the report and the version ultimately released by
the Pentagon.16 Missing from the released version, but present in the original
draft, were the following observations:
• “Pregnant single women were perceived to be a long-term burden.”
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• “When women, especially single women, intentionally become
pregnant to escape either unpleasant duties, a certain command, or a
deployment, both men and women resent the additional burden they
must shoulder as a consequence of their absence.”
• “Some unit commanders appear to feel pressured to report success in
the training, retaining, and promotion of women. Men who perceive
this believe women are given more opportunities than men to work
up to the standard.”
• “Women agreed that false harassment complaints are a problem, and
added that they undermine the ability of women who are truly
harassed to have their complaint taken seriously . . ..” 
Even the title of the report was changed to add an upbeat perspective. The
original title was the neutral, though descriptive, Recent Gender Integration
in the Military: Effects Upon Readiness, Cohesion and Morale. The title of
the report as released added a little spin: New Opportunities for Military
Women: Effects Upon Readiness, Cohesion and Morale.
Despite Harrell and Miller’s chronicling of fairly widely held perceptions
that integration was causing problems, there is reason to believe that what
they were told tended to understate the actual negative views. As Harrell and
Miller noted, unit commanders decided who should be included in the focus
groups they met with and who should not. Although Harrell and Miller
explicitly acknowledged that they might have been denied access to
“individuals with objectionable views,” they said they had no reason to
believe that this was the case.17 If it were done right, of course, they would
have no way of knowing what motivated unit commanders to select particular
participants.
The notion that commanders would select individuals with favorable
views is not fanciful. Miller herself reported in a different study that both
men and women have complained to her that when commanders select
personnel to meet with representatives of DACOWITS, they “typically sent
soldiers whom they knew to possess a view compatible with that of the
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DACOWITS.”18 That is a perfectly understandable approach for
commanders. After all, if you are a commander and you know that your
fitness report will include evaluation of your attitudes toward, and success at
furthering the careers of, women, you would be unlikely to send soldiers with
views perceived as “Neanderthal” to meet with DACOWITS. There is no
reason to think that commanders would have taken a different approach in
selecting personnel to be interviewed by Harrell and Miller. Thus, the views
expressed by personnel interviewed in these studies cannot be assumed to be
in any way representative of the military as a whole.
In sum, the Harrell and Miller study presented abundant evidence
inconsistent with its conclusion that sexual integration poses little threat to
cohesion or military effectiveness. Unfortunately, the MLDC did not appear
to look beyond the “spin” applied to those findings and thoughtfully examine
the underlying data before making its blithe recommendation favoring
complete integration.
B. 2009 DACOWITS Report
The MLDC also relied heavily on a 2009 report by the Defense
Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services,19 but that report
can hardly be considered authoritative, either. The charter of DACOWITS
is to provide the Secretary of Defense “independent advice and
recommendations on matters and policies relating to the recruitment and
retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly
qualified professional women in the Armed Forces.”20 Its members may or
may not have a military background. Only two of its members at the time of
the 2009 report had military experience (other than as a military wife), and
only one of those two had experience in the combat arms. DACOWITS has
a long history of seeking to expand women’s opportunities to serve in
Kingsley R. Browne
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combat-related fields, so the fact that it would reach conclusions favorable
to integration can hardly be a surprise. Thus, the expertise of the Committee
and its conclusions are less meaningful than the quality of the data upon
which it relied, and as will be seen below, the quality of the data was not
good.
The DACOWITS report’s primary data came from site visits conducted
at eight military installations, plus two “virtual site visits” to Iraq and
Afghanistan via video teleconference. Two members of the committee
conducted each focus group. A total of 42 focus groups were conducted,
involving 454 participants, all of whom had been deployed to Iraq or
Afghanistan at least once. The report contained the following findings:
• Most focus group participants, male and female, had been involved
in combat in Iraq or Afghanistan.21
• Most participants said that women serving in combat had a positive
impact on the mission, because women helped accommodate cultural
considerations (primarily in their interaction with female civilians),
helped maintain personnel strength, and provided a “unique
perspective” on the mission.22
• A majority of participants said that having women in combat “not
only does not erode morale but can be a positive influence, since
women often serve as confidants for male peers and are more likely
than men to organize morale-boosting celebrations.”23
• The overwhelming majority of participants indicated that women
should be able to fill all roles in the military for which they are
qualified.24
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• When asked what would be legitimate reasons for not allowing
women to serve in combat roles, most focus group participants cited
none.25
• The overwhelming majority of women reported that their combat
experiences had influenced their future plans, mostly by causing them
to want to separate from the military sooner than they had planned.26
There is no reason to think that the opinions of these focus-group
participants were in any way representative of military personnel generally,
or of combat-arm personnel in particular. First, the focus groups were not
broadly representative of combat (or even non-combat) personnel. Women
were substantially over-sampled in the focus group, with 70 percent of the
participants being women,27 despite the fact that women make up only about
14 percent of Active Duty forces. Moreover, the tendency for commanders
to select “DACOWITS-friendly” participants–and their incentive to do
so–has already been noted. Also, because there was only one male member
of the Committee at the time the data were gathered, every focus group was
led by at least one woman, and in most cases two women, which would
predictably have interfered with the willingness of participants, especially
men, to express negative views about sexual integration and the performance
of women. Laura Miller found in a study of attitudes of Army personnel that
many men would initially recite the “party line” about the success of
integration, and only when pressed would “their true feelings burst forth.”28
Other men would say nothing in mixed-sex groups, but when asked to stay
after the group was dismissed, they would indicate that they did not feel free
to state their true opinions publicly, especially in the presence of female
officers.
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The actual knowledge of the focus-group participants about combat is
also likely overstated. Although it sounds impressive that most female (and
male) participants had served in “combat roles” in Iraq or
Afghanistan–implying a general familiarity with the demands of combat–it
should be noted that the definition of “combat” used by DACOWITS was
exceedingly broad:
When one is physically in a combat theatre of operations where one
is exposed, on a regular or irregular basis, to the possibility of hostile
action from a threat, either to self or unit, requiring defensive or
offensive measures which may involve the use of arms to keep from
harm.29
Thus, to be deemed having served in a combat role, the minimum
requirement is that the individual was in a combat theatre and someone in his
unit was exposed on an irregular basis to the possibility of hostile action that
required defensive measures (such as, presumably, hiding under a desk).
Under this definition of combat, virtually every occupant of London served
in a combat role during the Blitz. In fact, only 8 percent of female
participants and 14 percent of male participants in the DACOWITS focus
groups reported having fired their weapons in theater. This is not to suggest
that focus-group participants did not serve ably or that their service did not
involve significant risk, but it is misleading to characterize all of them as
having served in “combat roles,” a characterization that may result in an
overestimation of their expertise about the demands of offensive ground
combat.
The Committee’s reporting of its results is also quite tendentious. It
reports, for example, that “When asked what would be legitimate reasons for
not allowing women to serve in combat roles, most focus group participants
cited none.”30 That statement might cause the casual reader to conclude that
most focus-group participants were unable to articulate any legitimate reason
for excluding women from ground combat. Yet that is not what the
Committee’s statement necessarily means. It may just mean that when the
Analysis of MLDC Report
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question was raised only a few participants affirmatively volunteered
answers, which is not at all inconsistent with many participants’ holding
negative views about sexual integration. For example, the fact that most
participants did not respond to the question would signal their beliefs only if
we could take their silence as indicating a belief that no such reasons existed.
But we do not know how respondents answered other open-ended questions,
so we cannot know whether the failure to volunteer a response was indicative
of a belief that no valid reasons existed or consistent with the way other
questions were responded to. Moreover, even if a majority of individuals in
a focus group believed, for example, that sexual issues or women’s relative
lack of strength were valid reasons to exclude women, once those issues had
been identified by just one participant, the reasons would be on the table, and
participants may not have thought that any purpose was served by listing an
objection that had already been mentioned. There is no indication in the
DACOWITS report that after particular reasons were mentioned there was
any polling to determine how widely shared those views were in the group.
Moreover, Laura Miller’s finding that participants (especially men) in such
groups are reluctant to make statements that could be viewed as “anti-
woman” has already been noted. Despite the inconclusive nature of what was
being reported, the Committee saw fit to employ the “most focus group
participants cited none” locution three times, once in the Executive Summary
and twice in the body of the report.31
Despite DACOWITS’s repeated statements that most participants did not
volunteer reasons for excluding women from combat, and despite the fact
that it stated that it found “little evidence that the organizational performance
of the military has been negatively impacted,”32 the report actually contains
a variety of statements suggesting that some participants did in fact entertain
substantial reservations. For example, the report stated:
A minority of participants, most of whom were male, expressed that
having females in combat negatively impacts unit morale. They cited
reasons such as sexual tension and harassment, female emotionality,
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having to exercise discretion or decorum to avoid offending females,
and differential Physical Training (PT) standards.33
The report then quoted a number of focus-group participants expressing
concerns about men’s being distracted by the presence of women,34 men’s
desire to protect women, women’s lesser physical strength and consequent
inability to do the job as well as men, the impact on personnel strength that
results when women get pregnant (sometimes deliberately) and either not
deploying or being sent home as a consequence, as well as logistical issues
such as hygiene.35 If one read only the Executive Summary of the
DACOWITS report, one would remain blissfully ignorant of these concerns.
DACOWITS also relied heavily on anecdotal accounts in newspaper
stories lauding the success of integration in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report
uncritically cites as authority a New York Times article stating that women
“have reshaped life on bases across Iraq and Afghanistan . . . And they have
done so without the disruption of discipline and unit cohesion that some
feared would unfold.. . . .”36 This conclusion seems to be based solely on
interviews with people that the reporter chose to talk to from among those he
was allowed to talk to. The Committee quoted that same article for the
proposition that women are “as much at risk as any male counterpart,” and
also quoted another Times article that reported that in both Afghanistan and
Iraq “women have done nearly as much in battle as their male
counterparts.”37 Without minimizing the contribution of women who served
in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is preposterous to argue that men and women were
equally involved in battle and faced equal risks, given the fact that despite
women’s making up about 11% of the personnel who served there, they
account for only about 2% of those killed in action and less than 2% of those
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evacuated for battle-related reasons. A male soldier was 5.5 times as likely
to be killed as a female one, suggesting that the magnitude of risk to which
the two sexes were exposed was, in fact, quite different. 
The articles in the Times, and many others like them, have one thing in
common: They do not contain a single quotation from anyone opposing the
further integration of women in combat. Given that polls, private
conversations, message-board postings, and even the RAND and
DACOWITS reports themselves routinely demonstrate widespread
opposition to sexual integration of combat units by men in ground-combat
specialties, one can only conclude that these stories do not tell the whole
story, whether because of bias in the selection of interview subjects,
reluctance of active-duty military personnel to speak candidly, or bias on the
part of the reporters or their publications. Whatever the reason, these stories
cannot be viewed as neutral accounts of women’s experience or of the
opinions of military personnel. Of course, when the press narrative strays
from touting the success of sexual integration to decrying the terrible
treatment that military women receive, then we hear stories of rape, sexual
harassment, PTSD, and lack of acceptance of women (all things that would
be expected to dramatically disrupt cohesion and degrade unit performance
but are never identified as doing so), but these two kinds of stories remain
strongly compartmentalized.38
The DACOWITS report itself resembles the above-mentioned news
accounts. For example, it notes that “concerns have been raised in the press
and by retired military commanders about the potential impact of women in
combat on mission performance, unit cohesion, and the well-being of the
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women involved (e.g., in areas such as hygiene and health care),”39 but it
does not actually cite any specific individuals who have raised those
concerns or the specific basis for those concerns, leaving the impression that
these are just vague and probably baseless allegations. When it refers to
arguments about the impact of women on mission accomplishment, effects
on cohesion, and sexual behavior between service members, it cites only to
publications that critique those arguments, rather than to the arguments made
by those raising concerns.40 As far as one can tell, it never bothered actually
considering the arguments themselves. That is no way to become educated
on a subject. Surely, one could not reasonably evaluate the theory of
anthropogenic global warming solely by relying on the characterization of
the theory by its opponents or evaluate the anti-warming arguments by
relying solely on the characterization of the theory’s proponents. In short, the
DACOWITS report simply cannot be taken seriously as a rigorous
examination of the issues that it purported to deal with.
The DACOWITS report dismissed concerns raised by a minority of
participants (“little evidence”41) as if they were insignificant if not endorsed
by a majority. However, group dynamics such as morale and cohesion are not
determined by a democratic vote. If, for example, two-thirds of group
members think that morale and cohesion are high, and one-third think that
morale and cohesion are low, it is the one-third who are correct. Moreover,
it is far from clear what standard of proof the Committee is applying. For
example, it says that “there has been no demonstrated impact on military
performance”42 as a consequence of pregnancies. Yet, the report itself cites
concerns raised about pregnancy and its effect on the mission. As discussed
below, the Army has been extremely reticent about losses due to pregnancy;
indeed, it has maintained that it is not even tracking the information. So, it
is hardly surprising that there has been no demonstrated impact, as it is not
clear that anyone has even sought to measure it. But surely the answer then
is not to conclude that there is no impact simply because no one has bothered
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to look. Instead, the more responsible course would be to attempt to analyze
existing data, and, if inadequate data exist, to gather better data.
In sum, the DACOWITS report is not a serious examination of the issue
of women in combat and is not worthy of serious consideration in setting
manpower policy.
C. Anecdotal Reports
The MLDC also appears to have relied heavily on select anecdotal
reports from the field. For example, it states that “Servicemembers and
commanders returning from Iraq, when questioned about the assignment
policy, consistently informed researchers that both male and female
servicemembers had performed well.”43 This blanket statement is
meaningless. It cannot mean that all service members performed well, since
there are always poor performers in large organizations. For example, the
statement cannot be taken to mean that those involved in the misconduct at
Abu Ghraib performed well. If the statement means that some male and some
female service members performed well, that also does not tell us anything
meaningful, as one would assume that most service members performed
well–that is, at some acceptable level. Even we were to give the Commission
the benefit of the doubt and assume that what the statement means is that
men as a group and women as a group performed equally well, that would
not mean that sexual integration did not have negative effects, as much of the
concern about integration involves reduction in unit effectiveness–that is,
concern that the presence of women diminishes the effectiveness of the entire
unit, including men in the unit. In any event, these bland statements are so
detached from any empirical foundation as to be worthless.
In fact, the DACOWITS report, upon which the MLDC appeared to place
substantial weight, makes it quite clear that the views of service members
who had served in Iraq were not consistently favorable, although
DACOWITS did its best to downplay those results. As noted above, a
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number of male focus group participants did in fact register specific
complaints about female performance: 
[T]hey said the mission impact was negative, for reasons including
men being distracted by women and wanting to protect them, women
not being as physically strong and therefore not able to do the same
job as a man, logistical issues such as hygiene, and women impacting
personnel strength by getting pregnant and then sent home.44 
It is unclear how to square the description of the views of these male
participants with the Commission’s implication that reports from those who
served in Iraq and Afghanistan were consistently favorable.
II. THE COMMISSION’S TREATMENT OF MANY
ISSUES IS SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT
Those raising concern about sexual integration have identified a large
number of problems that the MLDC gave scant, if any, attention. Three of
these are:
• Women’s relatively lesser strength
• Pregnancy and motherhood, especially single motherhood
• The effect of the introduction of women on cohesion of formerly all-
male groups
A. Strength and Physical Capacity
The Commission’s treatment of the issue of physical strength differences
was cursory at best. The word “strength”– in the context of physical strength
and not in the sense of “the strength that comes with diversity”–does not
appear in the Commission’s report. The subject of physical differences
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between the sexes is addressed in MLDC Issue Paper #56, however, but is
given short shrift. The entirety of the discussion is as follows:
Another argument is that women in combat impede mission
effectiveness because they cannot handle the same equipment or
tolerate the same physical stress as men. Indeed, women get the same
training and must meet generally the same health standards and
qualifications as men, although sometimes the physical requirements
differ. For example, the Army Physical Fitness Test, which consists
of push-ups, sit-ups, and a two-mile run, uses the same scale to score
sit-ups for both genders, with an easier scale for females in push-ups
and the run (APFT-standards.com, 2010). According to one female
soldier, however, varying fitness expectations “automatically sets
women soldiers apart and makes us appear less capable than men”
(Ross, 2010). When it comes to arguments about carrying equipment
or even wounded soldiers, some argue that inability may be more a
function of size than gender, and that the capabilities of smaller men
and larger women overlap. Ultimately, there is a lack of empirical
data on female fitness and correlation with battle performance other
than basic physical requirements by the Services.45
The Commission’s Decision Paper #2 cites Issue Paper #56 for the
proposition that “there is not much direct evidence to support claims that all
women lack the physical ability to perform in combat roles. In fact, women
and men have overlapping physical capabilities.”46
The Commission’s treatment of the physical capacity issue is incomplete
and misleading in a number of respects. First, although it acknowledges that
“sometimes the physical requirements differ” between the sexes, it gives no
clue about just how great these differences are. In fact, they are huge. The
table below shows the difference between the requirements for men and those
for women in order to score 100 points on the Physical Fitness Test:
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Standards for U.S. Army Physical Fitness Test47
Activity
Age
17-21 27-31 37-41 47-51 52-56
M F M F M F M F M F
Sit-ups 78 78 82 82 76 76 66 66 66 66
Push-ups 71 42 77 50 73 40 59 34 56 31
2-Mile Run
(min:sec)
13:00 15:36 13:18 15:48 13:36 17:00 14:24 17:36 14:42 19:00
As can be seen from the table, men and women are, as the Commission
notes, required to do the same number of sit-ups.48 However, the
requirements for the other tasks are substantially different by sex. The
average male requirement for push-ups across age groups is 72 percent
higher than it is for females. As for running, a 20-year-old woman is given
almost a full minute more to run two miles than a 56-year-old man is, and a
56-year-old woman is given over four minutes longer than a man of the same
age. These differences in standards are unsurprising, given the fact that
empirical data clearly reveal (also unsurprisingly) that men are substantially
stronger than women. In fact, there is less overlap in strength between the
sexes than there is in height. Indeed, the probability that a man selected at
random from the population will have greater upper-body strength than a
randomly selected woman is somewhere between 95 and 99%.49 (If there
were no overlap at all between the groups, of course, then the probability
would be 100%). 
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The Commission further suggests that “inability may be more a function
of size than gender,” and that the capabilities of smaller men and larger
women overlap.”50 Significantly, the authority for that proposition is merely
to note that “some argue,” without providing any source for the assertion in
order to determine whether there is actually any empirical basis for the
argument. At a trivial level, the statement is true: the smallest, weakest men
are weaker than the largest strongest women, although the smallest, weakest
men are unlikely to volunteer for the military. The extent of overlap,
however, is fairly small, with perhaps the strongest ten percent of women
being stronger than the weakest ten percent of men.51 So, one question is
simply whether there is enough overlap in strength to make a policy change
worthwhile.
To the extent that the Commission’s implication is that the difference
between the sexes in strength is solely a consequence of men’s greater size,
it is manifestly false. It is true that, all else being equal, men and women with
equal lean body mass (or “fat-free weight”) have largely equivalent strength,
as male and female muscular tissue is virtually identical. But men and
women of equal size have very different lean body mass. That is, a part of the
reason that men, on average, are stronger than women, on average, is that
they are bigger. But another significant reason is that a substantially greater
proportion of male weight comes from muscle, with a correspondingly lesser
proportion being made up of fat. 
The fundamental difference between men and women in musculature and
fat distribution is largely due to male and female sex hormones.52
Testosterone increases muscle mass, which in turn increases strength.
Testosterone levels are also associated with a reduction in body fat,
especially subcutaneous fat. As many male beer drinkers have come to learn,
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however, it does not decrease abdominal fat. Rather, it is estrogen that
inhibits deposition of fat in the abdomen, although it increases it in the
breasts, thighs, and buttocks.53 Thus, the sex difference in strength is much
more than just a sex difference in overall size. That is to say, as between men
and women of equal weight, men will be substantially stronger, especially
with respect to the upper body, where a disproportionately large amount of
male muscle is found.
As previously noted, the Commission’s Issue Paper #56 reported that
“there is not much direct evidence to support claims that all women lack the
physical ability to perform in combat roles.” As is so frequent in the
Commission’s work, it is setting up a straw man. It does not cite any source
for these claims, and it is extremely unlikely that any responsible person has
ever made the absolute claim the Commission labors to reject. Contrary to
the implication of the Commission, however, there is much evidence to
support claims that almost all women lack the physical ability to perform
ground-combat roles, although there is no indication in any of the
Commission’s documents that it made any effort to find such evidence. The
Commission could have consulted, for example, an extensive study
conducted by the British Ministry of Defence in 2002. That study made
findings that were quite relevant to the Commission’s analysis. It concluded:
The overwhelming majority of females applying to the Army or
currently serving in the Army would be physically incapable of
performing many of the tasks required by the Infantry and RAC
[Royal Armoured Corps]. Among the remainder who might achieve
the required standards, the risk of injury will be higher than among
their male counterparts, as these individuals will be working at a
higher percentage of their maximum capability, and their reserve
capacity will be less.
However, there remains a tiny minority of women estimated at 0.1
percent of recruits and 1 percent of trained soldiers who could
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probably achieve the required standards and perform the job
effectively without sustaining higher rates of injury.54
A U.S. Navy study in the 1980s reached similar conclusions. Examining
sex differences in ability to perform damage-control tasks at sea–some of the
most physically demanding, yet critical tasks, that shipboard personnel are
called upon to perform–the study found that “while clear majorities of
women (more than 90 percent in some cases) failed to meet the physical
standards for eight critical shipboard tasks, virtually all the men passed (in
most cases 100 percent).”55 One percent of women but 96 percent of men, for
example, could carry water pumps to the scene of a fire or flooded
compartment.
There we have it. One out of one thousand British female recruits were
estimated to have the potential to achieve the standards required for ground
combat and to perform without sustaining higher rates of injury. Thus, when
the Commission complains about the combat exclusion’s elimination of half
the recruiting pool for the military,56 its claims bears little relationship to
reality. Of course, there is no indication that the Commission even considered
any of this data, anyway.
Strangely, in the Branching and Assignments Decision Paper, the
Commission acknowledges that “any likely gender-neutral physical standard
for combat or entry into tactical fields, as is recommended by the
Commission, would disqualify a higher percentage of women than men,”57
but does not go on to examine the obvious question that follows from this
observation: how big would the disparity be? The answer to that question is
highly relevant to what the policy should be. If almost no women can satisfy
gender-neutral standards, as was the UK experience, then all of the changes
made to accommodate women throughout the ground-combat arms will
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produce very little “diversity” benefit, no doubt leading to pressure to reduce
standards in order to allow sufficient women to pass.
B. Pregnancy
Many who have raised questions about women’s participation in combat
have argued that pregnancy presents a substantial readiness challenge.58
Concerns have already been mentioned about the effects of pregnancy on
readiness and about the fact that women sometimes intentionally become
pregnant to avoid deployment, issues that were raised in the 1997 RAND
report (although largely excised from the released version) and by focus-
group participants in the DACOWITS study. Yet, the words “pregnant” and
“pregnancy” do not appear in the Commission’s report, nor can they be found
in the documentation supporting its recommendation to drop the combat
exclusion.59 The Decision Paper dealing with retention does acknowledge
that one of the reasons for women’s greater first-term attrition is pregnancy,
but the Commission does not connect that fact to military readiness.60
Nonetheless, the Commission casually recommends eliminating the combat
restriction, apparently oblivious to the detrimental effects of pregnancy on
the readiness of combat units. 
Reliable statistics on military pregnancies are not easy to get, but a
reasonable estimate is that around ten percent of military women are pregnant
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at any one time,61 differing somewhat by branch and rank. A comprehensive
Navy study of over 6,000 female crew members aboard 53 ships found an
overall pregnancy rate of 19 percent per year.62 The highest pregnancy rate
(27 percent) was on submarine tenders, the class of ships with the largest
number of women. A study of women in the Air Force–the service with the
highest proportion of women–found that about twelve percent of women had
one or more pregnancies in the study year.63
There is good reason to believe that pregnancy does have a negative
effect on readiness, and that effect is likely substantial. As a nation, we are
fortunate that when duty calls for the troops, it usually calls overseas. But
when overseas deployment is required, the non-deployability rate for women
is three to four times the rate for men, the difference being largely due to
pregnancy.64 Once a soldier is confirmed to be pregnant she becomes ‘non-
deployable’ and will remain so for up to a year. In the Navy, a new mother
is not assigned to sea duty for a full twelve months. After deployment, many
women must be sent back home because of pregnancy. According to the
Pentagon, over five percent of all military women deployed during the Gulf
War became pregnant, even though most were in the Gulf for far less than a
year.65 A 1999 study by the Center for Naval Analyses reported that “a
quarter of women and a tenth of men are lost from ships every year for
unplanned reasons.” Losses from pregnancy alone were eleven percent,
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meaning that there were more female losses due to pregnancy than there were
male losses altogether and also that there were more female losses due to
causes other than pregnancy than there were total male losses.66 
Despite the obvious relationship between pregnancy and readiness, the
military does not seem to have, or at least is not willing to release,
information concerning the question. When asked how many women had
been shipped home from Iraq because of pregnancy, a spokesman for Central
Command asserted, “We’re definitely not tracking it.”67 An Army
spokeswoman at the Pentagon said that the Army does not “release”
information on those who leave the war theater, implying that the
information is tracked, simply not released to the public. The Army’s
reticence on this issue goes back a long time. In 1997, Sara Lister, then-
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, candidly
stated that the Army does not publicly discuss strength and pregnancy issues
because “those subjects quickly became fodder for conservatives seeking to
limit women’s role in the Army.”68 In other words, evidence that women may
not be as capable as men in combat roles or that their inclusion will result in
a decline in readiness must be suppressed because it might be influential in
setting policy. Before advocating the kind of major shift suggested by the
MLDC, one might have thought that it would exhibit some curiosity about
this subject.
Unlike the MLDC report, the 2009 DACOWITS report did cite some data
about pregnancy in support of its contention that pregnancy has had “no
demonstrated impact on military performance.”69 However, the DACOWITS
treatment was extremely superficial, and it is doubtful that its data are
accurate or complete. The report states:
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Data prepared by the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center show
that in 2008, less than one percent (0.93%) of deployed women had
a pregnancy-related theatre medical encounter, and only 5 (less than
a tenth of one percent) had pregnancy-related medical evacuations.
(Data sources: Theater Medical Encounters (TMDS), TRAC2ES, and
DMSS).70
There is reason to think that the number reported for “pregnancy-related
theatre medical encounters” cannot be the full number of women who
became pregnant. First, the reported percentage is at least an order of
magnitude smaller than the number of pregnancies reported in most other
surveys. Second, DACOWITS reports that the number of women who had
pregnancy-related medical evacuations was approximately one-tenth of the
number of pregnancies reported. If the number of medical encounters is the
total number of pregnant women, that would mean that approximately one in
ten pregnant women were medically evacuated for pregnancy. However,
medical evacuation is costly (perhaps $10,00071) and reserved for serious
medical conditions, so it seems unlikely that ten percent of pregnancies
would have presented such substantial complications as to require medical
evacuation. Finally, although DACOWITS asserts that only five women had
pregnancy-related medical evacuations in 2008, the Armed Forces Health
Surveillance Center reports that during the ten-year period from October
2001 through September 2010, 318 women were medically evacuated for
pregnancy or childbirth,72 leading one to wonder why the ten-year average
was six times as high as the one year that DACOWITS chose for its report.
Despite DACOWITS’s assertion that pregnancy has had no
“demonstrated impact” on military performance, researchers who have
actually studied the matter have reached contrary conclusions. A report
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prepared by Army Major Merideth Bucher at the Air Command and Staff
College of the Air University makes a strong case that pregnancy is a serious
problem.73 Major Bucher reported that women have nearly four times as
much lost time as men, mostly because of pregnancy, and she cites a report
from the Center for Army Lessons Learned indicating that in some units at
the time of the Gulf War, 18 to 20 percent of female soldiers were
nondeployable either because of pregnancy or other physical problems. She
also cited the complaint of a battalion commander in the Gulf that one-third
of his women could not deploy or were sent home early because of
pregnancy, the most common reason for women’s evacuation from the Gulf.
Moreover, in their study of pregnancy in Iraq and Afghanistan, Albright and
colleagues reported in 2007 that “over the past 14 years, unintended
pregnancies have had a significant impact on military operations in the
combat zone.”74 Wholly apart from the social dynamics created by
pregnancy, simply the number of personnel who fail to deploy or who are
lost to pregnancy after deployment indicates a substantial readiness problem.
C. The Effect of Integration on Cohesion
The MLDC gave only cursory treatment to the issue of the impact of
sexual integration on cohesion, stating in its Branching and Assignments
Decision Paper that “[t]o date, there has been little evidence that the
integration of women into previously closed units or occupations has had a
negative impact on important mission-related performance factors, such as
cohesion.”75 In addition to cursory discussion of the previously mentioned
RAND and DACOWITS reports, the only authority cited for this proposition
is a female pilot’s statement that in her opinion women have not reduced
cohesion.76 Again, the Decision Paper on Branching and Assignments
seemed to take comfort in the fact that DACOWITS reported that “a
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majority” of focus-group participants reported that inclusion of women did
not have an adverse effect on morale, although some believed that it did.77
Finally, the benefits to morale cited by DACOWITS participants–organizing
birthday parties and providing confidantes for fellow soldiers–may or may
not translate to battlefield effectiveness–or, put another way, those benefits
may or may not outweigh other costs to cohesion created by integration.
One way that sexual integration can diminish cohesion is by reducing
discipline. It was precisely this effect that led the Federal Advisory
Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues (Kassebaum
Baker Committee) to unanimously recommend the elimination of sexually
integrated basic training in 1997 (although the Secretary of Defense rejected
the recommendation). That body found that integration led to “less discipline,
less unit cohesion and more distraction from the training programs.”78 More
recent anecdotal reports support the lack of discipline within sexually
integrated units.79 There is no indication that the MLDC considered any of
these sources.
There are other sources of information that the Commission could have
consulted, as well. For example, a 2000 study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies reported “significant perception problems” about the
job performance of female personnel, and it expressed surprise that a
significant percentage of women were skeptical about the performance of
female service personnel.80 The study also reported that focus group
discussions revealed more concern about female job performance and the
impact of sexual integration on unit cohesion than many studies in the past
had suggested. 
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Studies conducted by psychologist Leora Rosen have similarly found that
inclusion of women in army units can reduce cohesion, reporting that
“overall patterns indicate a consistent negative relationship” between the
percentage of women and unit cohesion.81 Of particular significance to the
question of women in ground-combat units is the finding that the negative
impact of women increases as the extent of physical danger increases. 
Rosen and colleagues found that the dynamics of cohesion differ between
the field and garrison. They found that increased time in the field was
positively correlated with “group hypermasculinity”–defined as “expressions
of extreme, exaggerated, or stereotypic masculine attributes and
behaviors”–in both all-male groups and mixed-sex groups.82 In mixed-sex
groups, field duty time was associated with decreased acceptance of women.
The researchers attributed this association to the fact that the field
environment “is likely to emphasize ‘warrior’ values of toughness,
independence, and aggression.” In male-only groups, hypermasculinity was
associated with both increased vertical and horizontal cohesion and
readiness. They concluded that “overall military organizational effectiveness
was thus still positively associated with a culture of hypermasculinity, even
with the inclusion of mixed gender units and the cultural changes that they
may have experienced.” They concluded that “ungendered professionalism,”
which has positive effects in the garrison environment, “may be difficult to
maintain in the field where a warrior culture is likely to develop, a culture
that may be necessary for the successful accomplishment of the mission.” 
Caution should be exercised in making important policy decisions based
upon an assumed lack of relationship between sexual integration and
cohesion. One problem with laboratory measures of cohesion is that they
may not be capturing the aspect of cohesion that is militarily important.83
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Cohesion is viewed by the military as a “performance enabler” rather than a
“performance enhancer.”84 It correlates with military performance “by
maintaining the organized group at its tasks in the face of severe stresses of
battle.”85 Because sociological studies of cohesion generally do not take
place in particularly stressful conditions, their results may substantially
underestimate the importance of cohesion in the primary circumstances in
which it matters most.
III. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES IGNORED BY
THE COMMISSION
There are a number of other issues that were apparently completely
ignored by the MLDC, and they will not be explored at length here, but they
should be considered by any serious study of sexual integration.86 These
include:
• The impact on mission achievement caused by male protectiveness
toward women87
• The impact of female prisoners of war, especially those who are kept
for a substantial period of time88
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• The impact of sexual and romantic relationships within combat units,
including jealousy, favoritism, and frustration, in addition to the
seemingly perpetual sex scandals that the military has endured89
• The adverse effects of double standards on morale90
• The question whether women can effectively lead men in the crucible
of active ground combat91
• The question whether men find it difficult to trust women in
dangerous circumstances92
• Single parenthood, which is much more of a problem for female
soldiers than for males93
• Hygiene issues, a concern that is sometimes ridiculed but is
nonetheless serious94
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• Potential recruitment and retention issues for women, as women learn
that they can be involuntarily assigned to combat duties, including
potential exposure of women to the draft should a draft be reinstated95
• Potential recruitment and retention issues for men, as many, if not
most,  men in combat arms oppose inclusion of women. Many feel
betrayed by their leaders, as they believe that equal opportunity is
“trumping” military effectiveness, which, for many, means that equal
opportunity is viewed by the leadership as more important than their
lives.96
All of these are serious issues that should be considered before embarking
on the policy change advocated by the MLDC.
Conclusion
The MLDC report is profoundly irresponsible. It cavalierly made
recommendations that could have devastating effects on the effectiveness of
the United States military with only a cursory nod to any of the serious
problems that sexual integration would cause and a complete neglect of most
of them. When it felt it lacked information on an issue, it did not seek to
obtain it; instead, it dismissed concerns as unproven. No policy maker should
rely on this report in considering whether to eliminate the exclusion of
women from ground-combat arms.
A serious consideration of the central question involved here cannot be
made by a “Diversity Commission.” Such a commission will always view its
charge as primarily about diversity and it will be staffed by people whose
expertise (and mission) is diversity. It shows in this report, which does not
mention the word “strength” in the context of physical strength, and it does
not mention the word “pregnant” or “pregnancy.” It uses the word
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“stakeholder” 15 times but never uses the term to refer to the American
people, who, one would think, are the principal stakeholders, with their
security being the principal stake. It uses the word “cohesion” only 6 times.
The word “battlefield” is not mentioned at all, but the word “diversity”
appears over 700 times. One would have to look long and hard to find a more
frivolous and irresponsible study.
 Battlefield effectiveness should be the sine qua non of manpower policy.
The decision whether to alter military manpower policy radically in a way
unprecedented in human history should be based on an analysis made by
people who know something about the subject, with military effectiveness
and not diversity as its guiding principle.
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